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1Abstract
This paper o⁄ers empirical evidence that real exchange rate volatility can have a signi￿-
cant impact on long-term rate of productivity growth, but the e⁄ect depends critically on
a country￿ s level of ￿nancial development. For countries with relatively low levels of ￿nan-
cial development, exchange rate volatility generally reduces growth, whereas for ￿nancially
advanced countries, there is no signi￿cant e⁄ect. Our empirical analysis is based on an 83
country data set spanning the years 1960-2000; our results appear robust to time window,
alternative measures of ￿nancial development and exchange rate volatility, and outliers. We
also o⁄er a simple monetary growth model in which real exchange rate uncertainty exacerbates
the negative investment e⁄ects of domestic credit market constraints. Our approach delivers
results that are in striking contrast to the vast existing empirical exchange rate literature,
which largely ￿nds the e⁄ects of exchange rate volatility on real activity to be relatively small
and insigni￿cant.
21 Introduction
Throughout the developing world, the choice of exchange rate regime stands as perhaps the
most contentious aspect of macroeconomic policy. Witness, on the one hand, the intense
international criticism of China￿ s in￿ exible exchange rate system. On the other hand, South
African policymakers are chastized for not doing enough to stabilize their country￿ s highly
volatile currency. Yet, despite the perceived centrality of the exchange rate regime to long-
run growth and economic stability, the existing theoretical and empirical literature o⁄ers little
guidance. The theoretical literature is mainly tailored to richer countries with highly developed
institutions and markets (e.g., Garber and Svensson 1995 and Obstfeld and Rogo⁄, 1996), and
there is almost no discussion of long-run growth. The empirical literature is largely negative,
suggesting to some that the degree of exchange rate ￿ exibility simply does not matter for
growth, or for anything except the real exchange rate.1
In this paper, we develop and test a simple framework suggesting that a country￿ s level of
￿nancial development ought to be central in choosing how ￿ exible an exchange rate system
to adopt, particularly if the objective is long-run productivity growth. Interestingly, we
￿nd striking and apparently robust evidence that the more ￿nancially developed a country
is, the better it will do with a more ￿ exible exchange rate. The volatility of real shocks
relative to ￿nancial shocks ￿which features so prominently in the literature on developed
country exchange rate regimes ￿also matters for developing countries. But because ￿nancial
shocks tend to be greatly ampli￿ed in ￿nancially underdeveloped economies, one has to adjust
calibrations accordingly.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between productivity growth and exchange rate ￿ exibil-
ity for countries at di⁄erent levels of ￿nancial development. The upper graphs consider the
volatility of the e⁄ective real exchange rate and the lower graphs deal with the exchange rate
1The classic paper is Baxter and Stockman (1989). In their survey, Gosh, Gulde, and Wolf (2003) state
that ￿ perhaps the best one can say is that the growth performance of pegged regimes is no worse than that
of ￿ oating regimes￿ . More recent studies include Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), Razin and Rubinstein
(2004), Husain, Mody and Rogo⁄ (2005), De Grauwe and Schnabl (2005), and Dubas et al. (2005). Section 2
discusses this literature in more details. We note that Baldwin (1992), in his analysis of European Monetary
Union, argued that a single currency might have growth e⁄ects on Europe by reducing the exchange rate
premium on capital within Europe. Husain et al. (2005) argue informally that ￿xed rates may be more
important for countries with more fragile political and ￿nancial institutions, but they do not provide any direct
evidence for this view. There is some evidence of an e⁄ect of exchange rate volatility on trade levels (Frankel
and Wei, 1993 and Rose, 2000). The e⁄ect, however, does not appear to be large and it is even less clear
that the resulting trade expansion has any great impact on welfare (see Krugman, 1987, or Bacchetta and van
Wincoop, 2000).
3regime classi￿cation proposed by Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2004). In each case, we compare the
residuals of a productivity growth regression on a set of variables with the residuals of an
exchange rate ￿ exibility regression on the same variables.2 By doing so, we obtain adjusted
measures of volatility and ￿ exibility that are purged from any collinearity with the standard
growth determinants. Countries are ranked in function of their ￿nancial development mea-
sured by private credit to GDP over ￿ve-year averages. The left-hand side of both Panels
shows the lower quartile and the right-hand side shows the upper quartile of the distribu-
tion. There is clearly a negative relationship between productivity growth and exchange rate
￿ exibility for less ￿nancially developed countries, while we see no relationship for the most
developed economies.
We take the results in Figure 1 as preliminary evidence that the growth e⁄ects of real
exchange rate volatility and the ￿ exibility of the exchange rate regime vary with the level of
￿nancial development. The main purpose of this paper is to rationalize and then explore the
robustness of this ￿nding. In Section 2 we develop a model of an open monetary economy
with wage stickiness, where exchange rate ￿ uctuations a⁄ect the growth performance of credit-
constrained ￿rms. Exchange rate ￿ uctuations in turn are caused by both real and ￿nancial
aggregate shocks. The basic mechanism underlying the positive growth interaction between
￿nancial development and exchange rate volatility can be explained as follows. Suppose
that the borrowing capacity of ￿rms is proportional to their current earnings, with a higher
multiplier re￿ ecting a higher degree of ￿nancial development in the economy. Suppose in
addition that the nominal wage is preset and cannot be adjusted to variations in the nominal
exchange rate. Then, following an exchange rate appreciation, ￿rms￿current earnings are
reduced, and so is their ability to borrow in order to survive idiosyncratic liquidity shocks
and thereby innovate in the longer term. This, in turn, may help explain why in Figure 1
growth in countries with lower ￿nancial development bene￿ts more from a ￿xed exchange rate
regime.3 We also show in Section 2 that the superior growth performance of a more stable
2We perform a pooled regression using ￿ve-year average data for 83 countries over 1970-2000. The controls
include initial productivity, secondary schooling, ￿nancial depth, government expenditure, trade openness,
term-of-trade growth and an indicator of banking and currency crises. The variables are de￿ned in Section 2
and in the Appendix. For each quartile, we regress growth residuals on the adjusted measures of real exchange
rate volatility and the ￿ exibility of the exchange rate regime.
3A related explanation, which can be easily formalized in the context of our model, is that the lower ￿nancial
development, the more the anticipation of exchange rate ￿ uctuations should discourage R&D investments. This
would lower growth if these investments were to be decided before ￿rms know the realization of the aggregate
shock (since ￿rms anticipate that with higher probability, their R&D investment will not pay out in the long
run as it will not survive the liquidity shock).
4exchange rate holds as long as the volatility of ￿nancial market shocks is large compared to
the volatility of real shocks. However, the source of shocks only matters at lower levels of
￿nancial development.
In the second part of the paper, we test our theoretical predictions by conducting a sys-
tematic panel data analysis with a data set for 83 countries over the years 1960-2000. When a
country￿ s de facto degree of exchange rate ￿ exibility is interacted with its level of ￿nancial de-
velopment the results prove both robust and highly signi￿cant. We consider various measures
of exchange rate ￿ exibility, including the volatility of the real e⁄ective exchange rate and the
exchange rate regime. We use the classi￿cation of Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2004) in the main
analysis, but ￿nd that our results are generally robust to other de facto classi￿cations.4 We
consistently ￿nd that a high degree of exchange rate ￿ exibility leads to lower growth in coun-
tries with relatively thin ￿nancial markets. Moreover, these e⁄ects are not only statistically
signi￿cant, they appear quantitatively signi￿cant as well. For example, our estimates indicate
that a country which lies in the middle of the lower quartile (e.g., Zambia in 1980), with
credit to GDP of 15%, would have gained 0.94 percent of annual growth had it switched from
a ￿ exible to a totally rigid exchange rate. Even a country in the middle of the second quartile
(like Egypt in 1980), with credit to GDP of about 27%, would have gained 0.43 percent growth
per year by adopting a uniform pegged exchange rate. Our core results appears to hold intact
against a variety of standard robustness tests, including attempts to quarantine the results
against outliers and regional e⁄ects and allowing for alternative control variables. We also
consider alternative measures of exchange rate volatility, as well as considering distance to the
technological frontier as both alternative, and supplementary, interaction variables. Finally,
we adopt a variety of approaches to addressing the problem of exchange regime endogeneity,
both using techniques within our GMM methodology and by examining the broader historical
evidence on the choice of exchange rate regime.
Our results markedly depart from the dominant view of an exchange rate ￿disconnect￿
(Obstfeld and Rogo⁄, 2001), and in doing so they suggest new directions for research on the
choice of exchange rate regime. For example, we show that while exchange rate ￿ exibility
has the desirable property of dampening the impact of real shocks, on average it still has a
negative impact of productivity growth in less ￿nancially developed economies.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
4The classi￿cation of Reinhart and Rogo⁄ is more appropriate in our context, since they focus mainly on
exchange rate volatility, in particular including dual and multiple exchange rates. Other classi￿cations, such as
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), capture better the constraints on monetary policy by including changes
in reserves in de￿ning their classi￿cation. However, our focus is on exchange rate volatility.
5derives the theoretical predictions. Section 3 develops our empirical analysis and results. The
data are detailed in an appendix, which also includes the results of further robustness tests.
2 A Simple Model
The model in this section combines three main elements. First, productivity grows as a result
of innovation by those entrepreneurs with su¢ cient funds to meet short-run liquidity shocks.
This feature is similar to Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee, and Manova (2005). Second, macroeco-
nomic volatility is driven by nominal exchange rate movements in presence of wage stickiness.
This monetary feature borrows from the recent New Open Economy Macroeconomics litera-
ture. We assume that the central bank either ￿xes the nominal exchange rate or lets it ￿ oat
and follows an interest rate rule. Third, the exchange rate is imperfectly correlated with other
macroeconomic variables, e.g., aggregate productivity, which in turn is consistent with the
evidence. We model this by introducing risk premium shocks that are exogenous to the real
economy. Thus, exchange rate volatility depends upon both the variance of real shocks and
that of risk premium shocks.
2.1 A small open economy with sticky wages
We consider a small open economy populated by successive overlapping generations of two-
period lived entrepreneurs and workers. The economy produces a single good identical to the
world good. One half of the individuals are selected to become entrepreneurs, while the other
half become workers. Individuals are risk neutral and consume their accumulated income
at the end of their life. Growth will be determined by the proportion of entrepreneurs who
innovate.
Since ￿rms in the small domestic economy are price-takers, they take the foreign price of
the good at any date t, P￿
t , as given. Assuming purchasing power parity (PPP), converted
back in units of the domestic currency, the value of one unit of sold output at date t is equal
to:
Pt = StP￿
t ; (1)
where Pt is the domestic price level and St is the nominal exchange rate (number of units of
the domestic currency per unit of the foreign currency). We will assume that P￿
t is constant
and normalize it to 1.5 Thus, Pt = St.
5We implicitly assume that the foreign country strictly targets the price level.
6In a ￿xed exchange rate regime, St is constant, whereas under a ￿ exible exchange rate
regime St is random and ￿ uctuates around its mean value E(St) ￿ S.6 The reason why
￿ uctuations in the nominal exchange rate St will lead to ￿ uctuations in ￿rms￿real wealth,
with consequences for innovation and growth, is that nominal wages are rigid for one period
and preset before the realization of St. This in turn exposes ￿rms￿short-run pro￿ts to an
exchange rate risk as the value of sales will vary according to St whereas the wage bill will
not.7
For simplicity, we take the wage rate at date t to equate the real wage at the beginning
of that period to some reservation value; kAt. The parameter k < 1 refers to the workers￿
productivity-adjusted reservation utility, say from working on a home activity, and At is
current aggregate productivity which we ￿rst assume to be non-random. We thus have:
Wt
E(Pt)
= kAt;
where Wt is the nominal wage rate preset at the beginning of period t and E(Pt) is the
expected price level. Using the fact that E(Pt) = E(St) = S; we immediately get
Wt = kSAt: (2)
2.2 The behavior of ￿rms
Individuals who become entrepreneurs take two types of decisions.8 First, at the beginning
of their ￿rst period, they need to decide how much labor to hire at the given nominal wage;
this decision occurs after the aggregate shocks are realized. Second, at the end of their ￿rst
period entrepreneurs face a liquidity shock and must decide whether or not to cover it (if
they can) in order to survive and thereby innovate in the second period. The proportion ￿t
of entrepreneurs who innovate determines the growth rate of this economy. We ￿rst describe
production and pro￿ts and then consider these two decisions in turn.
6A constant foreign interest rate can be justi￿ed if we assume a technology with constant real return r
￿.
Since there is no in￿ ation in the foreign country we have i
￿ = r
￿.
7In this benchmark model, the interesting measure of the real exchange rate is based on labor costs. The
real rate based on price levels becomes of interest once we introduce non-traded goods or distribution services.
That real exchange rates are more volatile under a ￿ exible exchange rate regime is documented in Appendix
D.
8One can easily extend the model so as to allow ￿rms to increase the probability of innovation by investing
more in R&D ex ante.
72.2.1 Production and pro￿ts
The production of an entrepreneur born at date t in her ￿rst period, is given by
yt = At
p
lt;
where lt denotes the ￿rm￿ s labor input at date t.9
Given current nominal wages, nominal pro￿ts at the end of her ￿rst period are given by
￿t = Ptyt ￿ Wtlt = AtSt
p
lt ￿ kAtSlt (3)
In her second period, the entrepreneur innovates and thereby realizes the value of inno-
vation vt+1; with probability ￿t which depends upon whether the entrepreneur can cover her
liquidity cost at the end of her ￿rst period. As we shall see, in an economy with credit con-
straints, the latter depends upon the short-term pro￿t realization and therefore upon both
employment and the aggregate shocks in the ￿rst period.
Employment in the ￿rst period is then chosen by the entrepreneur in order to maximize
her net present value:
max
lt
fAtPt
p
lt ￿ kAtSlt + ￿￿tEtvt+1g; (4)
where ￿ denotes the entrepreneur￿ s discount rate.
2.2.2 Innovation, liquidity shocks and credit constraints
Innovation upgrades the entrepreneur￿ s technology up by some factor ￿ > 1, so that a success-
ful innovator has productivity At+1 = ￿At. It is natural to assume that the value of innovation
vt+1 is proportional to the productivity level achieved by a successful innovator, that is
vt+1 = vPt+1At+1;
with v > 0.
Next, we assume that innovation occurs in any ￿rm i only if the entrepreneur in that
￿rm survives the liquidity shock Ci
t that occurs at the end of her ￿rst period. Absent credit
constraints, the probability of overcoming the liquidity shock would be equal to one, if the
value of innovation is larger than the cost, and to zero otherwise. In either case, this probability
would be independent of current pro￿ts. However, once we introduce credit constraints, the
probability of the entrepreneur being able to innovate will depend upon her current cash-￿ ow
and therefore upon the choice of lt:
9Our choice of production technology is made for analytical simplicity, but at the end of this section we
discuss how our model and results extend to more general settings.
8We assume that the liquidity cost of innovation is proportional to productivity At; accord-
ing to the following linear form (multiplied by Pt as it is expressed in nominal terms):
Ci
t = ciPtAt;
where ci is independently and identically distributed across ￿rms in the domestic economy,
with cumulative distribution function F which we assume to be strictly concave over the
interval between 0 and c. While all ￿rms face the same probability distribution over ci ex
ante, ex post the realization of ci di⁄ers across ￿rms. We assume that the net productivity
gain from innovating (e.g., as measured by v￿) is su¢ ciently high that it is always pro￿table
for an entrepreneur to try and overcome her liquidity shock.
In order to pay for her liquidity cost, the entrepreneur can borrow on the local credit
market. However, credit constraints will prevent her from borrowing more than a multiple
￿ ￿ 1 of current cash ￿ ow ￿t: We take ￿ as being the measure of ￿nancial development and
we assume that is it constant.10 The borrowing constraint is no longer binding if ￿ becomes
large.
Thus, the funds available for innovative investment at the end of the ￿rst period are at
most equal to
￿￿t;
and therefore the entrepreneur will innovate whenever:
￿￿t ￿ Ci
t: (5)
Thus; the probability of innovation ￿t is equal to11
￿t = F(
￿￿t
StAt
): (6)
2.2.3 Equilibrium pro￿ts
Now, we can substitute for ￿t in the entrepreneur￿ s maximization problem. The entrepreneur
will choose lt to maximize (4) which yields
lt =
￿
St
2kS
￿2
and therefore
￿t =  AtS2
t ; (7)
10If ￿ was endogenous, it would decrease with more volatile pro￿ts, thus reinforcing the negative impact of
exchange rate volatility.
11We always have ￿t > 0 since ￿t > 0 in equilibrium and St > 0 .
9where   ￿ 1=(4kS): We thus see that equilibrium pro￿ts are increasing in the nominal ex-
change rate St:
Next, from (6), we can express the probability of innovation as:
￿t = F(￿ St): (8)
2.3 Productivity growth and the main theoretical prediction
Expected productivity at date t + 1 is equal to:
E(At+1) = E(￿t)￿At + (1 ￿ E(￿t))At:
The expected rate of productivity growth between date t and date (t+1), is correspondingly
given by
gt =
E(At+1) ￿ At
At
= (￿ ￿ 1)E(￿t): (9)
We can then establish:
Proposition 1 Moving from a ￿xed to a ￿exible exchange rate reduces average growth; the
growth gap goes to zero as ￿nancial development measured by ￿ becomes large:
Proof: From (9), the average growth rate gt is proportional to the expected proportion
of innovating ￿rms. Thus, to compare a ￿xed exchange rate (i.e., no exchange rate volatility)
with a ￿ exible rate, we just need to look at the di⁄erence between the corresponding expected
innovation probabilities:
￿t = ￿ ￿ E(￿t);
where
￿ = F(￿ S)
and
E(￿t) = E (F (￿ St)):
The ￿rst part of the proposition follows immediately from the concavity of F: And the
second part follows from the fact that both F(￿ S) and E (F (￿ St)) converge to 1 as ￿ goes
to in￿nity.
Remark 1: Convergence: The model can be turned into a convergence model, for example
by assuming that innovating ￿rms catch up with a world technology frontier growing at some
rate g, at a cost which is proportional to the world frontier productivity: Based upon the
convergence analysis in Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer (2005), we conjecture that the lower the
10degree of ￿nancial development in a country, the more likely it is that higher exchange rate
volatility will prevent the country from converging to the world technological frontier in growth
rates and/or in per capita GDP levels.
Remark 2: More general cost distributions and production technologies: Proposition
1 makes use of the concavity of the cumulative distribution function on liquidity shocks F:
First, note that this assumption is satis￿ed, at least over large intervals, for a large class of
density functions. Second, even if this assumption is violated, or with more general production
technologies, Proposition 1 holds as long as ￿ is su¢ ciently close to one. The intuition is very
simple: in this case, more volatility around S implies essentially the same ability to overcome
the liquidity shocks in a boom when St is high, whereas it implies lower values of St and
therefore a lower survival probability ￿t in slumps, all the lower when ￿ is smaller. It then
follows immediately that ￿ ￿ E(￿t) must be positive. Finally, when ￿ << 1; then there is the
possibility that more volatility could stimulate innovation and thereby productivity growth in
expansions, which we refer to as a ￿ gambling for resurrection￿e⁄ect. However, Figure 1 and
our regressions in the next section suggest that this latter e⁄ect is dominated.
2.4 On the stabilizing role of ￿ exible exchange rates
Even though the exchange rate is more volatile than other fundamentals, it is endogenous
and is potentially correlated with other variables. In this section, we sketch a simple general
equilibrium model where the nominal exchange rate reacts to productivity and risk premium
shocks. Assume that domestic productivity is random and can be expressed as:
At = Ateut; (10)
where: (i) At is the country￿ s level of knowledge at date t; which in turn results from innova-
tions in period t ￿ 1; according to:
At = (￿t￿1(￿ ￿ 1) + 1)At￿1;
(ii) ut is a productivity shock with mean E(ut) = 0 and variance ￿2
u:
We assume that the nominal wage is set before the productivity shock is known. Thus,
analogously to equation (2) we have Wt = kSAt. It is easy to show that equation (7) is
replaced by:
￿t =  tA2
tS2
t ; (11)
where  t ￿ 1=(4kSAt): Thus, the probability of innovation is given by:
￿t = F(￿ tAtSt): (12)
11This probability is determined by the volatility of the product AtSt.
We now describe the exchange rate behavior. Arbitrage between domestic and foreign
bonds by foreign investors yields the following interest parity condition (expressed in logs):
st = se
t+1 + ln(1 + i￿) ￿ ln(1 + it) + ￿t (13)
where it and i￿ represent domestic and foreign nominal interest rates (on one-period bonds)
and st = lnSt. The foreign interest rate is taken as given and assumed to be constant. The
variable ￿t represents a time-varying risk premium determined by investors in the foreign
exchange market. Risk-premium shocks are introduced to model the ￿ disconnect￿between
nominal exchange rate variations and other fundamental variables.12 The variance of the risk
premium is ￿2
￿ and we assume that E(￿t) = 0 and cov(￿t;ut) = 0.
For notational simplicity, we assume that when the exchange rate regime is ￿xed, it is set
at st = 0. When the exchange rate regime is ￿ exible, the central bank follows an interest
rate rule and the exchange rate is determined by the market.13 In order to stabilize pro￿ts,
the central bank reacts to exchange rate shocks (equivalent to price level shocks) and to
productivity shocks.14 The rule takes the form:
ln(1 + it) = ￿0 + ￿1 ￿ st + ￿2 ￿ ut (14)
where we assume that ￿0 = ln(1 + i￿) and that ￿1 and ￿2 are given.
By substituting this rule back into (13), integrating forward and ruling out speculative
bubbles, we ￿nd that the equilibrium exchange rate can be expressed as:
st =
1
1 + ￿1
￿t ￿
￿2
1 + ￿1
ut: (15)
In particular, we see that the exchange rate reacts negatively to productivity shocks.
12Risk-premium shocks come from the behavior of investors who trade for reasons other than the ratio-
nally expected return. For example, Jeanne and Rose (2002) and Devereux and Engel (2003) assume that
some traders have biased expectations; Duarte and Stockman (2005) assume shocks to perceived covariances;
and Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) assume hedging trade. The latter show that when investors have
heterogenous information, small shocks to hedging trade have a large impact on the exchange rate.
13Our focus in this section is on comparing the impact of di⁄erent exchange rate regimes on productivity
growth, rather than examining the factors that lead a country to choose one or the other regime. In practice,
economic ideology, history, political considerations and many other ￿ exogenous￿factors almost surely play a
role in the choice of exchange rate regime, yet analyzing them goes behind the scope of this paper.
14See Woodford (2003) for a discussion of interest rate rules and Kollman (2002) and Obstfeld (2004) for
an application in an open-economy context. Kollman also introduces risk premium shocks to generate more
realistic exchange rate volatility.
12Since the probability of innovation is determined by the volatility of AtSt, we need to
compare this volatility under ￿xed and ￿ exible exchange rates. It is easy to show that the
growth gap between ￿xed and ￿exible rates increases with the relative variances of risk premium
to productivity shocks, ￿2
￿=￿2
u.15 Moreover, when productivity shocks are large compared to
risk premium shocks, a ￿ exible rate gives higher growth. More precisely, expected growth
E(￿t) is higher under a ￿ exible exchange rate when:
￿2
u > {￿2
￿
where { = 1=[￿2(2(1 + ￿1) ￿ ￿2)]. Thus, Proposition 1 holds as long as the volatility of
productivity shocks is not too large relative to the volatility of risk premium shocks. When real
shocks dominate in the foreign exchange market, a ￿ exible exchange rate may be preferred.16
However, the source of shocks only matters at low levels of ￿nancial development: when ￿ is
very large the growth gap between ￿xed and ￿ exible rates goes to zero independently of the
source of shocks.
3 Empirical Analysis
Previous studies have shown that ￿nancial development fosters growth and convergence, con-
ditions macroeconomic volatility, or may play a crucial role in ￿nancial crises. An interesting
question is whether the level of ￿nancial development also conditions the impact of monetary
arrangements, such as the exchange rate regime. Our basic hypothesis is that the exchange
rate regime, or more generally exchange rate volatility, has a negative impact on (long-run)
growth when countries are less developed ￿nancially.
To test these predictions, we consider standard growth regressions to which we add a
measure of exchange rate ￿ exibility, as well as an interaction term with exchange rate ￿ exibility
and ￿nancial development or some other measures of development. In this section, we consider
three measures related to exchange rate ￿ exibility: i) the exchange rate regime based on the
natural classi￿cation of Reinhart and Rogo⁄(2004), henceforth RR; ii) the standard deviation
15Under a ￿xed exchange rate, we simply have lnAtSt = lnAt + ut, while under a ￿ exible rate we have
lnAtSt = lnAt + [(1 + ￿1 ￿ ￿2)ut + ￿t]=(1 + ￿1). We can simply compare var(lnAtSt) in each case.
16Notice that we ignore the impact of interest rate volatility. It is usually argued that interest rates are
more volatile under a ￿xed exchange rate. This would be true in our model if ￿
2
￿ is the same across regimes.
However, it is seems likely that ￿
2
￿ is lower under a peg. Empirically, interest rates do not appear much more
volatile under ￿xed exchange rates. We found the following nominal interest volatility in our sample: peg:
6.2%; limited ￿ ex: 9.2%; managed ￿ oat: 9.4%; ￿ oat: 5.4%. Using another classi￿cation, Shambaugh (2004)
￿nds that interest rates are more volatile under ￿ exible rates.
13of the real e⁄ective exchange rate; iii) the degree of real ￿ overvaluation￿ , as a deviation of the
real exchange rate from its long-term value. We also examine the interaction between terms-
of-trade shocks, the exchange rate regime, and growth. We ￿rst present the methodology and
the variables used and then the results based on a dynamic panel of 83 countries over the
1960-2000 period.
3.1 Data and methodology
As is now standard in the literature, we construct a panel data set by transforming our time
series data into ￿ve-year averages. This ￿lters out business cycle ￿ uctuations, so we can focus
on long-run growth e⁄ects. Our dependent variable is productivity growth, rather than total
growth. We use the GMM dynamic panel data estimator developed in Arellano and Bond
(1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1997) and we compute robust two-
step standard errors by following the methodology proposed by Windmeijer (2004).17 This
approach addresses the issues of joint endogeneity of all explanatory variables in a dynamic
formulation and of potential biases induced by country speci￿c e⁄ects. The panel of country
and time-period observations is unbalanced. Appendix B presents the list of countries included
in the sample.
Our benchmark speci￿cation follows Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) who provide evidence
of a growth enhancing e⁄ect of ￿nancial development; they were the ￿rst to use the system
GMM estimation we are using. We consider productivity growth instead of total growth,
but our regressions are estimated with the same set of control variables.18 Starting from this
benchmark, we examine the direct e⁄ect on growth of our exchange rate ￿ exibility measures.
Then, we look at the interaction between these measures and the level of ￿nancial development.
More speci￿cally, we estimate the following equation:
yi;t ￿ yi;t￿1 = (￿ ￿ 1)yi;t￿1 + ￿1ERi;t + ￿2ERi;t ￿ Ii;t + ￿Ii;t + ￿0Zi;t + ￿t + ￿i + "i;t (16)
17It has been recognized that the two-step standard errors are downward biased in a small sample and the
Windmeijer (2004) method corrects for that. Notice that, as the two-step estimator is asymptotically e¢ cient,
this approach is superior to just relying on ￿rst step estimates and standard errors as is common in the empirical
growth literature that uses small samples. See Bond (2002) for a simple description of the methodology we
follow.
18See their table 5, page 55. The other di⁄erences with Levine et al. (2000) are that we use a larger data set,
we use the Windmejer standard errors, and we include a ￿nancial crisis dummy. Loayza and Ranciere (2005)
show that their results stay unchanged when the original panel is extended to 83 countries over 1960-2000
and when a crisis dummy is introduced. Levine et al. (2000) show similar results when the same equation is
estimated in cross-section with legal origin as external instrument.
14where yi;t is the logarithm of output per worker; ERi;t is either the degree of ￿ exibility of the
exchange rate regime, real exchange rate volatility, or a measure of overvaluation; Ii;t is the
dimension of interaction, i.e., ￿nancial development; Zit is a set of other control variables, ￿t
is the time-speci￿c e⁄ect, ￿i is the country-speci￿c e⁄ect, and "i;t is the error term.
Our hypothesis is that ￿1 < 0 and ￿2 > 0 so that the impact of exchange rate ￿ exibility
￿1 + ￿2 ￿ Ii;t is more negative at low levels of ￿nancial development. Moreover, when ￿1 and
￿2 have opposite signs, a threshold e⁄ect arises:
￿(yi;t ￿ yi;t￿1)
￿ERi;t
= ￿1 + ￿2Ii;t > 0 , Ii;t > e I := ￿
￿1
￿2
In Tables 1 to 3, we report threshold levels of ￿nancial development above which a more
￿ exible exchange rate becomes growth enhancing. The standard errors of the respective
threshold levels are computed using a delta method, that is by taking a ￿rst order Taylor
approximation around the mean. Notice that in small samples, the delta method is known to
result in excessively large standard errors.
We use three measures for the variable ERi;t. First, we compute an index of ￿ exibility of
the exchange rate regime in each ￿ve-year period based on the RR exchange rate classi￿cation.
Ignoring the free falling category, the RR annual natural broad classi￿cation orders regimes
from the most rigid to the most ￿ exible: ERRt 2 f1;2;3;4g = ffix;peg;managed float;floatg.
Hence, we construct the index of exchange rate ￿ exibility in each ￿ve-year interval as:19
Flext;t+5 =
1
5
5 X
i=1
ERRt+i
The second measure we consider for ERi;t is the ￿ve-year standard deviation of annual
log di⁄erences in the e⁄ective real exchange rate. We construct the e⁄ective rate as a trade-
weighted index of multilateral real rates as explained in Appendix A. The third measure is
the ￿ve-year average deviation from a predicted level of the real e⁄ective exchange rate.20
For the interaction variable Ii;t we consider ￿nancial development measured as in Levine,
Loayza and Beck (2000) by the aggregate private credit provided by banks and other ￿nancial
institutions as a share of GDP. The dependent variable is growth in real GDP per worker. Our
set of control variables includes average years of secondary schooling as a proxy for human
19The information on the ￿ exibility of exchange rate is reported for each country-5 years interval during
which the RR classi￿cation indicates a non free falling regime for at least 3 out of 5 years.
20We compute the average log di⁄erence between the actual exchange rate and the exchange rate predicted by
country and time speci￿cic characteristics (income per capita, population densisty, regional and time dummies)
as in Dollar (1992). We also considered average log di⁄erences from a HP detrended multilateral exchange rate
series as in Goldfajn and Valdes (1999), and found similar results.
15capital, in￿ ation and the size of the government (government expenditure as proportion of
GDP) to control for macroeconomic stability, and an adjusted measure of trade openness.21
A dummy indicating the frequency of a banking or a currency crisis within each ￿ve-year
interval is introduced in the robustness checks. This indicator controls for rare but severe
episodes of aggregate instability likely to be associated with large changes in the variables of
interest.22 De￿nition and sources for all variables are given in Appendix C.
3.2 Exchange rate ￿ exibility and ￿nancial development
Tables 1, 2 and 3 present the estimations of the impact of the exchange rate regime, exchange
rate volatility and real overvaluation on productivity growth. Each table displays the results
of four regressions. The ￿rst regression estimates the e⁄ects of the exchange rate measure
along with ￿nancial development and a set of control variables, without interaction term.
The second regression adds a variable interacting the exchange rate measure and the measure
of ￿nancial development in order to test our main prediction: the presence of a non-linear
e⁄ect of exchange rate volatility on growth depending on the level of ￿nancial development.
The third and fourth regressions replicate the same regressions with the addition of a dummy
variable indicating the frequency of a currency or banking crisis in the ￿ve-year interval.
In Table 1, regression [1.1] illustrates the absence of a linear e⁄ect of the exchange rate
regime on productivity growth. This result is consistent with many previous studies. In
contrast, regression [1.2] shows that the interaction term of exchange rate ￿ exibility and
￿nancial development is positive and signi￿cant. The more ￿nancially developed an economy
is, the higher is the point estimate of the impact of exchange rate ￿ exibility on productivity
growth. Furthermore, the combined interacted and non-interacted coe¢ cient of ￿ exibility
becomes signi￿cant at the 5% level (as indicated by the Wald Test in Table 1). Combining
these two terms enables us to identify a threshold of ￿nancial development below (above)
which a more rigid (￿ exible) regime fosters productivity growth. The point estimate of the
threshold is close to the sample mean of the ￿nancial development measure. In regressions
[1.3] and [1.4], we introduce the crisis dummy described above. While the frequency of crisis
indeed has a negative impact on productivity growth, the non-linear e⁄ect of exchange rate
regime on growth remains robust and its point estimate stays almost unchanged.
21More precisely we use the residuals of a pooled regression of (imports + exports)/GDP against structural
determinants of trades such as landlock situation, an oil producers dummy, and population.
22For instance, Loayza and Hnakovska (2003) present evidence that crisis volatility can explain an important
part of the negative relashionship between volatility and growth observed in middle-income economies.
16The main result of Table 1 is that letting the degree of exchange rate ￿ exibility vary
with the level of ￿nancial development allows us to identify signi￿cant growth e⁄ects of the
exchange rate regime. The implication is that less ￿nancially developed economies may derive
growth bene￿ts from maintaining a rigid exchange rate regime. As illustrated by the examples
given in the Introduction, these bene￿ts can be economically large. This result provides a
novel rational interpretation for the "fear of ￿ oating" behavior based on long run productivity
growth.
Table 2 presents similar results with exchange rate volatility measured by the ￿ve-year
volatility of the change in multilateral real exchange rates. Regression [2.1] indicates that
exchange rate volatility has a signi￿cant negative impact on productivity growth. This ef-
fect is economically important: an increase of 50 percent in exchange rate volatility - which
corresponds to the mean di⁄erence in volatility between a ￿xed and a ￿ exible exchange rate
(see Appendix D) - leads to a 0.33 percent reduction in annual productivity growth. This
e⁄ect is only marginally reduced when we control for the impact of a crisis, as in regression
[2.3]. Regression [2.2] shows that the interaction between exchange rate volatility and ￿nan-
cial development is positive and signi￿cant: the more ￿nancially developed an economy is,
the less adversely it is a⁄ected by exchange rate volatility. Here again, the economic impact
is important. For instance, consider Chile, whose level of ￿nancial depth ranges from 10%
in 1975 to 70% in 2000. This drastic change decreases the negative impact of exchange rate
volatility on growth by a factor of ￿ve. Moreover, our estimate indicates that exchange rate
volatility exhibits no signi￿cant impact on productivity growth for the set of the ￿nancially
most developed economies.23
Table 3 presents regressions that focus on the e⁄ect of real exchange rate overvaluation.
We present the results using the deviation between the actual e⁄ective real exchange rate
and its predicted value.24 In the baseline regression [3.1], real overvaluation has a signi￿-
cant and economically important negative e⁄ect on growth: a 20% overvaluation translates
into a reduction of 0.2% in annual productivity growth (computed from regression [3.1] as
0.99*ln(120/100)). Regression [3.2] studies the e⁄ect of interacting real overvaluation and
￿nancial development and shows that the more ￿nancially developed an economy is, the less
vulnerable it becomes to real overvaluation. Using the previous example, a change in ￿nancial
depth comparable to the one experienced by Chile over 1975-2000 results in a reduction by
23These are countries with a private credit to GDP ratio in the range of [90%,120%]. This includes the euro
aera, the U.K., Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, the US, and Australia.
24We obtain similar results when we consider HP deviation from trend when - as in Golfajn and Valdes
(1999) - the HP ￿lter parameter is set high enough (lamba=10
8).
17two of the negative e⁄ect of real overvaluation on productivity growth.
3.3 Terms-of-trade growth and exchange rate ￿ exibility
It is often argued that a ￿ exible exchange rate regime is desirable since it can stabilize the
e⁄ects of real shocks. In subsection 2.4, we showed that a ￿ exible exchange rate can indeed
lead to higher growth when the variance of real shocks is large. Moreover, there is recent
empirical evidence showing that ￿ exible exchange rate regimes tend to absorb the e⁄ects of
terms-of-trade shocks (see Broda, 2004, and Edwards and Levy-Yeyati, 2005). We examine
this issue by including terms-of-trade growth and terms-of-trade volatility in our previous
regressions and present the results in Table 4.
In regression [4.1], a 10% deterioration in the terms of trade leads to a reduction of 0.9%
in productivity growth.25 In regression [4.2], we ￿nd that the impact on productivity growth
of a terms-of-trade shock crucially depends on the nature of the exchange rate regime. It is
larger under a ￿xed exchange rate regime and close to zero under a ￿ oating regime. This
result con￿rms the stabilizing role of ￿ exible exchange rates. However, in regression [4.3], we
show that this stabilization e⁄ect fully coexists with the growth enhancing e⁄ect of a more
￿xed regime at low level of ￿nancial development. Thus, the empirical evidence shows that
even though exchange rate ￿ exibility dampens the impact of terms-of-trade shocks, it has a
negative overall impact on growth for ￿nancially less developed countries since on average,
terms-of-trade growth is close to zero.
In regression [4.4], we show that terms-of-trade volatility has a negative e⁄ect on produc-
tivity growth: a one standard deviation increase in terms-of-trade volatility reduces growth
by 0.4 percentage point. In regression [4.5], we ￿nd that a more ￿ exible exchange rate regime
dampens the negative impact of terms-of-trade volatility. In fact, the total e⁄ect of terms-
of-trade volatility on productivity growth becomes close to zero under a fully ￿ exible regime.
In regression [4.6], we ￿nd that the interaction of exchange ￿ exibility with ￿nancial develop-
ment and with terms-of-trade volatility are both positive and signi￿cant suggesting that both
variables condition the impact of exchange rate ￿ exibility on productivity growth. However,
even under the assumption of large terms-of-trade volatility - set at the 75th percentile of the
variable sample distribution- a more ￿xed exchange regime is growth enhancing for countries
in the lowest quartile of ￿nancial development.26
25Our ￿ndings con￿rms the results of Mendoza (1997) who show that both negative terms-of-trade change
and terms-of-trade uncertainty lower economic growth.
26The 75th percentile of the sample distribution of terms-of-trade volatility in log is 2:38 and the 25th
183.4 Endogeneity issues
At this point, the main quali￿cation to our results would seem to be the standard question of
endogeneity. To examine whether this is a serious issue in our context, we can i) make various
test within our GMM methodology and ii) examine the broader existing empirical evidence
on the determinants of exchange rate regimes or exchange rate volatility. Both perspectives
indicate that endogeneity is not a major factor behind our results. First, our dynamic panel
procedure using the GMM system estimator controls for the potential endogeneity of all the
explanatory variables and accounts explicitly for the biases induced by including the initial
level of productivity in the growth regressors. It is true that the estimation procedure is valid
only under the assumption of weak exogeneity of the explanatory variables. That is, they
are assumed to be uncorrelated with future realizations of the error term. We can test this
assumption by a Sargan test of overidenti￿cation which evaluates the entire set of moment
conditions in order to assess the overall validity of the instruments. The results of the Sargan
test in Tables 1 to 4 show that the validity of the instruments cannot be rejected.27
Nevertheless, as pointed by Baum and al. (2003), the Sargan test may fail to detect the
lack of validity of a subset of instruments. We address this issue through two robustness
checks. First, we use "di⁄erence-in-Sargan" statistics to directly test the validity of subsets
of orthogonality conditions. We could not reject the validity of any particular subset of in-
struments. Second, we re-estimate our baseline regression by substituting in the instrument
matrix the second lag level by the third lag level of the explanatory variables.28;29 This esti-
mation yields very similar results and insures that our results are not biased by the presence
of some omitted variables that could be correlated with exchange rate ￿ exibility and have an
independent e⁄ect on next period innovation in productivity growth.
Furthermore, our empirical approach has several features that makes it less vulnerable
percentile of the sample distribution of ￿nancial development in log is 2:65: The total growth e⁄ect of exchange
rate ￿ exibility, moving up one step in the RR classi￿cation, for a country with such levels of terms-of-trade
volatility and ￿nancial development is therefore ￿2:748 + 0:476 ￿ 2:38 + 0:525 ￿ 2:6 = ￿0:25:
27A second test examines whether the di⁄erenced error term is second-order serially correlated, a necessary
condition for the consistency of the estimation. In all regressions, we can safely reject second order serial
correlation.
28For predetermined variables such as initial income or initial secondary schooling, the ￿rst lag level is
replaced by the second lag level.
29The results reported in the main tables are obtained with an instrument matrix that includes only the
closest appropriate lags of the explanatory variables. The choice to restrict the instrument matrix is dictated
by two considerations: (i) the Sargan test loses power when the set of instruments becomes large; (ii) if we
used more instruments, we would run into a classical over￿tting problem.
19to a potential endogeneity bias. First, we focus on identifying contrasting growth e⁄ects of
exchange rate ￿ exibility and volatility at di⁄erent levels of ￿nancial development. Endogeneity
will be less of an issue with an interaction term than with single variables.30 Second, we note
that we obtain similar results for various measures of exchange rate volatility, as well as when
we look at other measures of ￿nancial development (see below). Finally, by excluding high
in￿ ation ￿freely falling￿exchange rate regimes in our baseline regressions, we are hopefully
eliminating the most egregious cases where weak institutions would simultaneously explain
low productivity growth and the choice of exchange rate regime (generally ￿ exible because
high in￿ ation makes a sustained ￿x impossible).
The second avenue to evaluate the potential endogeneity problem is to rely on the existing
literature that tries to explain exchange rate volatility or exchange rate regimes. The literature
on exchange rate volatility is small, but it ￿nds some robust determinants for the degree
of volatility. For instance, Hau (2002) ￿nds a negative correlation between real exchange
rate volatility and trade openness.31 However, this does not a⁄ect our estimation as our
speci￿cation includes both real exchange rate volatility and trade openness as regressors and
treat them as jointly endogenous. Hausmann and al. (2004) investigate the determinants
of real exchange rate volatility and ￿nd that GDP growth has a positive and statistically
signi￿cant e⁄ect. This ￿nding suggests that if a reverse causality link stems for growth to
volatility, this link should be positive thus reinforcing our results.
The literature on the endogeneity of exchange rate regimes is more extensive, but it has
been largely inconclusive. For instance, Juhn and Mauro (2002) apply the extreme bound
method of Levine and Renelt (1992) on the e⁄ect of a large set of variables on the exchange rate
regime and do not ￿nd any robust determinant.32 However, in a recent paper, Levy-Yeyati,
30Assume for instance that the choice of exchange rate regime coincides with the choice of other policies
associated with higher future growth opportunities unaccounted for by the set of explanatory variables. This
could directly bias the estimation of the e⁄ect of exchange ￿ exibility in a linear regression set up. In contrast,
this could bias the estimation of the interaction coe¢ cient in our set-up only to the extent that the correlation
between such policies and exchange rate ￿ exibility or volatility varies signi￿cantly with the level of ￿nancial
development.
31Bravo and di Giovanni (2005) have complemented this ￿nding by showing that real exchange volatility is
correlated with an index of remotness de￿ned as weighed geographical distance from main trade centers. This
correlation suggests that remotness can be a valid external instrument for real exchange volatility. However,
remotness exhibits almost no time variation and thus is a weak instrument in our dynamic panel context. When
we use remoteness as an external instrument in a pure cross-sectional estimation, our results broadly hold but
with less signi￿cance.
32The ￿ndings of Juhn and Mauro (2002) have been obtained using Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) de
facto classi￿cation and the IMF de jure classi￿cation. We applied the same methodology to the RR classi￿cation
20Sturzenegger, and Reggio (2004), using a logit analysis, ￿nd that some political variables can
explain the likelihood of adopting a given exchange rate regime. We ￿nd that one of their
political variables, VetoPoints, is a good instrument for exchange rate regimes.33 When we
include this instrument in our GMM analysis, we ￿nd results similar to those of Table 1.
Beyond econometric tests, one can use the broad historical evidence to form a judgement
on the endogeneity of exchange rate choices to future growth prospects. This is the approach
followed by Eichengreen (1992) in his classical treatise. He shows that countries￿choice to exit
the inter-war gold standard had a huge impact on their subsequent growth trajectories. At the
same time, the undisputed dogma in that period was that staying within the gold standard
system was a necessary condition for economic recovery. A detailed discussion of the history
of post-War exchange rate regimes falls outside the scope of this paper. However, our reading
of the evidence compiled by Margaret De Vries (1985) and James Boughton (2001), in their
massive sequential histories of the International Monetary Fund, is certainly consistent with
politics, history and ideology playing a dominant role in most countries￿choice of exchange
rate or monetary policy regime.34 Indeed, although it is hard to deny that growth was always
an objective of monetary policy, these histories make clear that there is a very large exogenous
(for our purposes) component to exchange regime choice as well.35
3.5 Robustness tests
The set of regressions presented in Tables 1 to 4 o⁄ers solid evidence that the level of ￿nan-
cial development plays an important role in mitigating the negative e⁄ects of exchange rate
volatility on productivity growth. It is also reassuring that control variables in the regressions
and found the same result. We would like to thank Paulo Mauro for sharing his methodology.
33We would like to thank Eduardo Levy-Yeyati for providing us the data. VetoPoints is an index measuring
the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives. Notice that the
non-political variables used in Levy-Yeyati et al. are already included in the set of our control variables.
34The dominant view of the IMF on exchange rate arrangement changed several time the last thirty years of
the past century. In the early seventies, the IMF proposed to substitute to the failing Bretton Woods system, a
system of ￿xed but adjustable exchange rate. Later in the decade, the conventional wisdom in the Fund became
that the ￿ oating-rate regimes were working reasonably well. In the eighties, the Fund became gradually more
favorable to ￿xed exchange rates regimes and their associated stabilizing and trade-promoting virtues. This
position was later reversed in the nineties and the IMF started promoting exit strategies for countries seeking
exchange rate ￿ exibility (Eichengreen and al., 1998).
35Mussa (1986), especially, presents compelling evidence that the di⁄erent behavior of real exchange rates
under ￿xed versus ￿ oating regimes cannot possibly be attributed to exchange rate regime endogeneity (in part
because the change typically occurs exactly on the day a country switches regimes even when the decision is
announced long in advance.)
21have the expected e⁄ects: education and trade openness have a positive and often signi￿cant
impact on growth while the e⁄ect of in￿ ation and government burden is negative although
not always statistically signi￿cant. Moreover, the results stay unchanged when the e⁄ects of
crises are accounted for.
In this subsection, we discuss further evidence on the robustness of our main empirical
￿ndings. We examine whether the results are robust to di⁄erent time periods, alternative
exchange rate classi￿cations, di⁄erent measures of ￿nancial development and the omission of
subgroups of countries. The main results corresponding to this discussion are presented in
tables A1 to A8.
3.5.1 Di⁄erent time windows
Using time e⁄ects in all our regressions, we control for any common factor that could a⁄ect
all countries in any ￿ve-year interval. Moreover, our non-linear speci￿cation implicitly allows
for time and cross-country variation in the e⁄ect of the ￿ exibility of the exchange rate regime
on productivity growth. However, we would like to check if our results hold when di⁄erent
time windows are used for the estimation. A sensitive issue is whether we should use any
information from the period prior to the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system (1973). Our
baseline time span is 1960-2000, but the early observations are used as internal instruments so
that the ￿rst observation in levels that is actually considered in the estimation belongs to the
1970-1975 interval, while the ￿rst observation in di⁄erence is taken between the 1970-1975 and
the 1965-1970 intervals. In Table A1, we are more restrictive and consider the information
available only for the period 1970-2000 and in the period 1975-2000. In both cases, our main
result holds. Moreover, the interaction coe¢ cient is higher, indicating a stronger dependence
of the e⁄ect of the ￿ exibility of the exchange regime on the level of ￿nancial development.
We also consider three successive periods of 20 years: 1960-1980; 1970-1990; 1980-2000. Our
result holds signi￿cantly in the last two periods but not in the ￿rst, suggesting that our
￿nding is actually stronger when we restrict our regression analysis to the post Bretton-Woods
era. Performing the same robustness test on the e⁄ect of the interaction between ￿nancial
development and real exchange rate volatility leads to the same conclusions. As shown in
Table A2, the interaction e⁄ect is stronger when the information available is restricted to
1970-2000.
223.5.2 Alternative exchange rate regime classi￿cations
We have already examined the impact of three substantially di⁄erent measures of exchange
rate ￿ exibility and obtained very similar results. However, it is useful to examine the results
with other exchange rate classi￿cations. Table A3 presents the robustness test to four alter-
native exchange rate classi￿cations. In three out of four cases, our main result holds. First,
our result is con￿rmed when the degree of exchange rate ￿ exibility is measured on a more
detailed scale using RR coarse classi￿cation (i.e., using 13 categories instead of the 4 used in
the other tables). We notice that the implicit threshold above which a ￿ exible exchange rate
regime is growth enhancing is almost identical for the gross and coarse RR classi￿cations.36
Second, the alternative de facto "consensus" classi￿cation of Gosh et al. (2003) yields similar
results.
In contrast, when the classi￿cation of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) (LYS) is used,
the interaction with the level of ￿nancial development becomes negative but insigni￿cant.
In order to understand the di⁄erences between the results obtained with the RR and LYS
classi￿cations, we modify the latter in the following way: ￿rst, we eliminate the observations
classi￿ed as free-falling by RR; second, we reclassify the observations with a dual exchange
rate according to the RR classi￿cation. We then obtain a classi￿cation that combines the
LYS clustering approach with the main innovations of RR. Interestingly, when this modi￿ed
classi￿cation is used in the baseline regression, our main ￿nding is con￿rmed.37 In that case,
the point estimate of the interaction term is slightly higher than the point estimate of the
interaction term in the regression using the RR classi￿cation on the same sample period (0.68
vs. 0.43).
3.5.3 Alternative measures of real exchange rate volatility
We consider two alternative measures of exchange rate volatility: ￿rst, a measure of real
e⁄ective exchange rate volatility computed with CPI indices and nominal exchange rates;
second, a measure of nominal e⁄ective exchange rate volatility computed only with nominal
exchange rates (see Appendix A for details). Table A4 reproduces the ￿rst two regressions
presented in Table 2 over the full sample period and over a subsample period restricted to the
post Bretton-Woods era.
When CPI-based real exchange volatility is introduced in the linear growth regression, it
3655% vs 59% when the gross classi￿cation over 1970-2000 is considered (Table A1, col. 1)
37This seems to indicate that the LYS method tends to classify as ￿xed countries that are, de facto, more
￿ exible through a dual exchange rate system, as well as countries that experience episodes of high in￿ ation.
23exerts a negative and signi￿cant impact of productivity growth. The non-linear speci￿cation
gives results very similar to our baseline estimation: the point estimate of the interaction
term between exchange rate volatility and ￿nancial development is almost identical. The non-
linear speci￿cation using nominal e⁄ective exchange rate volatility delivers results similar to
our baseline speci￿cation when the estimation is restricted to the post Bretton-Woods era. In
that case, the magnitude of the interaction e⁄ect is close to the one obtained with real volatility
(0.69 vs. 0.74). However, this result is not robust to the inclusion of the pre Bretton-Woods
era: in that case, the interaction coe¢ cient becomes small and insigni￿cant. This result may
not be surprising since nominal volatility was much lower under Bretton Woods.
3.5.4 Alternative measures of ￿nancial development
Table A5 shows the robustness of our main result to the use of alternative measures of ￿nancial
development. Our initial and preferred measure is private credit to GDP from banks and
other ￿nancial institutions. Our main result still holds when we consider the other side of the
￿nancial sector balance sheet (liquid liabilities over GDP) or when we restrict ourselves to a
measure of the degree of ￿nancial intermediation provided by deposit money banks (deposit
money banks assets over GDP).
3.5.5 Alternative measure of economic development
Instead of ￿nancial development we consider the distance to the technology frontier (repre-
sented by the US) expressed as:
di;t = ln(yi;t=li;t) ￿ ln(yus;t=lu;t)
where yi;t and li;t are the initial level of output and the labor force at the inception of each
￿ve year period. As our regressions include a common time e⁄ect, we can simply ignore the
term ln(yus;t=lu;t) and measure the distance to the frontier using the absolute level of labor
productivity, ln(yi;t=li;t).
As we are using the same baseline speci￿cation, the regressions without interacted terms
are identical to the ones presented in columns 1 and 3 of Tables 1, 2, and 3. Notice that in the
pure linear speci￿cation the coe¢ cient on initial output per worker, i.e., the convergence term,
is negative but not signi￿cant, except in the regression using real exchange rate volatility.
Table A6 presents the results of regressions performed using the ￿ exibility of exchange rate
regime, real exchange rate volatility and real overvaluation.
24The three regressions shown in Table A6 show that the interaction between labor pro-
ductivity and exchange rate ￿ exibility has a positive and signi￿cant impact on growth. The
interpretation is that the higher the level of productivity is, the better (or the less detrimen-
tal) is the impact of a more ￿ exible exchange rate on productivity growth. We can identify a
threshold level of output per worker above (below) which a more ￿ exible (rigid) regime fosters
productivity growth. For example, in the ￿rst column the point estimate of this threshold is
US$ 5000 (constant 1995 US$), which is close to the current productivity levels of present-day
Thailand and Peru and to the levels of Korea and Chile in the seventies.
3.5.6 Omission of continents
Table A7 and Table A8 show that our main result remains stable and signi￿cant when sub-
groups of countries are omitted in a systematic way. Our sample is partitioned into seven
"continents" according to the World Bank classi￿cation. Then, the two baseline regressions
(Regression [2], Table 1 and Regression [2], Table 2) are repeated with the omission of one
continent at a time. The interaction term between exchange rate ￿ exibility or volatility and
￿nancial development remains positive and signi￿cant at the 10 percent con￿dence level in
thirteen out of fourteen regressions.38 Moreover, its point estimate is also stable and varies
within a one standard error band around the corresponding benchmark point estimate.
3.5.7 Crises and regime switching
A typical scenario of a currency crisis is a period of a ￿xed exchange rate with growth followed,
after a large devaluation, by a more ￿ exible exchange rate and a depressed economy (e.g., the
Asian, Mexican and Southern Cone crises). To determine whether this might be the driving
force behind our results in Table 1, we made various tests. First, we introduced a crisis dummy
in Table 1 and showed that this does not signi￿cantly a⁄ect our results. Second, we identi￿ed
the cases in our sample where a switch from ￿xed to ￿ oat was associated with a large decline
in growth. We only found 6 episodes with a decline in growth larger than 5%. Removing
them from the sample does not a⁄ect the results of Table 1.39
38This result is especially remarkable considering that Windmejier (2004) correction for small sample is used
in the estimation.
39These episodes are Chile & Ecuador (81-82), Indonesia & Thailand (97-98), Ghana (73-74) and Jamaica
(90-91). The other episodes, such as Argentina in the early 1980s, are in the free falling category in RR and
are not considered in our sample in Table 2.
253.5.8 Robustness against alternative non linear hypotheses
We use an interaction term to test the hypothesis of a non linear growth e⁄ect of exchange
rate ￿ exibility or exchange rate volatility in the level of ￿nancial development. It is therefore
important to distinguish our hypothesis from other alternative non-linear hypotheses. As a
￿rst robustness test, we add to our speci￿cation a quadratic term in exchange rate ￿ exibility
and a quadratic term in ￿nancial development.40 Our main result changes very little in this
speci￿cation. A second robustness test is performed using the following procedure:41 (i) ￿rst
we regress exchange rate ￿ exibility on the other regressors and obtain a ￿ exibility residual;
(ii) second, we regress ￿nancial development on the other regressors and obtain a ￿nancial
development residual; (iii) we perform our baseline estimation replacing the interaction term
by the interaction of the computed residuals. By this method, we exclude the possibility
that our result is in￿ uenced by other interaction e⁄ects between ￿nancial development or
exchange rate ￿ exibility and the rest of the explanatory variables.42 In this speci￿cation, the
interaction e⁄ect between exchange rate ￿ exibility and growth remains signi￿cant. Its point
estimate is indeed slightly larger suggesting that if anything, the baseline speci￿cation tends
to underestimate the magnitude of the interaction e⁄ect.
4 Conclusion
The vast empirical literature following Baxter-Stockman (1989) and Flood-Rose (1994) gener-
ally ￿nds no detectable di⁄erence in macroeconomic performance between ￿xed and ￿ oating
exchange rate regimes. In this paper, we argue that instead of looking at exchange rate volatil-
ity in isolation, it is important to look at the interaction between the exchange rate volatility
and both the level of ￿nancial development and the nature of macroeconomic shocks. We de-
velop a theoretical model in which higher levels of exchange rate volatility can stunt growth,
especially in countries with thin capital markets and where ￿nancial shocks are the main
source of macroeconomic volatility. Our predictions are then shown to be largely validated by
cross-country panel data, which thus provide fairly robust evidence suggesting the importance
of the ￿nancial development for how the choice of exchange rate regime a⁄ects growth.43
40The idea of the test is that if ￿nancial development is correlated with exchange rate ￿ exibility, the inter-
action term can capture a quadratic e⁄ect in ￿nancial development or in exchange rate ￿ exibility.
41We are grateful to Ben Sorensen for having suggested this robustness test.
42We also exclude once more the hypothesis of a quadratic e⁄ect in ￿nancial development or exchange rate
￿ exibility
43Rogo⁄ et. al (2004) and Husain, Mody and Rogo⁄ (2005) do ￿nd di⁄erences in exchange rate regime
performance across developing countries, emerging markets and advanced economies. However, perhaps because
26Are our result at odds with the prescriptions of the standard exchange rate models? Not
necessarily. The classical literature holds that the greater the volatility of real shocks relative
to ￿nancial shocks a country faces, the more ￿ exibility it should allow in its exchange rate. Our
analysis shows that this prescription has to be modi￿ed to allow for the fact that ￿nancial
market shocks are ampli￿ed in developing countries with thin and poorly developed credit
markets. Clearly, more fully articulated structural models are needed to properly measure the
tradeo⁄s, and this would appear to be an important challenge for future research.
they do not incorporate any structural variables in their regressions such as private credit to GDP, or distance
to frontier, they only found signi￿cant and robust e⁄ects of exchange rate regime choice on growth in advanced
economies.
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Figure 1: Real Exchange Rate Volatility, Exchange Rate Flexibility and Productivity Growth
33Table 1
Growth Effects of the Flexibility of Exchange Rate Regime
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Output per Worker
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) Small Sample Robust Correction and Time Effects
(Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
Period:
Unit of observation:
[1.1] [1.2] [1.3] [1.4] 
Degree of the Exchange Flexibility -0.191 -1.135 * -0.144 -1.227 **
(Reinhart and Rogoff clasisification) 0.349 0.579 0.288 0.563
Financial Development 0.684 ** 0.185 0.655 ** 0.258
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) 0.347 0.160 0.326 0.941
Initial Output per Worker -0.150 -0.117 -0.152 -0.126
(log( initial output per worker)) 0.418 0.447 0.447 0.461
Flexibility * Financial Development 0.303 ** 0.336 **
0.146 0.159
Control Variables:
Education 1.493 ** 1.518 ** 1.481 ** 1.509 **
(secondary enrollment, in logs) 0.630 0.676 0.574 0.605
Trade Openness 1.632 * 1.626 * 1.719 ** 1.407 *
(structure-adjusted trade volume/GDP, in logs) 0.914 0.858 0.869 0.799
Government Burden -1.842 * -1.950 * -1.917 * -1.989 *
(government consumption/GDP, in logs) 1.088 1.136 1.114 1.150
Lack of Price Stability -2.731 -2.767 -1.660 -2.470
(inflation rate, in log [100+inf. rate]) 1.757 1.761 2.088 1.850
Crisis -1.826 * -1.741 *
(banking or currency crisis dummy) 1.054  1.075
Intercept 15.711 ** 17.418 ** 10.940 15.731 *
7.5131 8.509 9.4513 9.2799
No. Countries / No. Observations 79/497 79/497 79/497 79/497
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p-values)
 (a) Sargan Test: 0.252 0.227 0.291 0.367
 (b) Serial Correlation:
       First-Order 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
       Second-Order 0.348 0.361 0.441 0.388
WALD TESTS (p-values)
Ho :Exchange Rate Flexibility Total Effect=0  0.009 0.000
Ho :Financial Development  Total Effect =0 0.035 0.044
** means significant at 5% and * means significant at 10%
Source: Authors' estimations
THRESHOLD ANALYSIS
Growth enhancing effect of exchange rate flexibility:   
Private Credit /GDP greater than: 0.424 0.385
s.e. 0.190 0.170
1960-2000
Non-overlapping 5-year averages
34Table 2
Growth Effects of  Real  Effective Exchange Rate Volatility
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Output per Worker
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) Small Sample Robust Correction and Time Effects
(Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
 
Period:
Unit of observation:
[2.1] [2.2] [2.3] [2.4] 
Real Exchange Rate Volatility -0.637 ** -3.124 ** -0.554 ** -3.319 **
0.273 1.204 0.262 1.208
Financial Development 1.111 ** -0.650 0.987 ** -0.729
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) 0.455 0.808 0.402 0.821
Initial Output per Worker -1.112 ** -0.530 -1.025 ** -0.828 **
(log( initial output per worker)) 0.391 0.474 0.360 0.404
Exchange Rate Volatility * Financial Development 0.677 ** 0.706 **
0.262 0.277
Control Variables:
Education 1.807 ** 1.778 ** 1.976 ** 2.378 **
(secondary enrollment, in logs) 0.532 0.694 0.465 0.585
Trade Openness
(structure-adjusted trade volume/GDP, in logs) 1.053 * 1.115 ** 1.420 ** 1.579 *
0.572 0.769 0.569 0.975
Government Burden -0.416 -0.928 -1.068 -0.871
(government consumption/GDP, in logs) 1.153 1.070 1.104 1.372
Lack of Price Stability -2.569 * -1.961 -1.872 * -1.172
(inflation rate, in log [100+inf. rate]) 1.487 1.237 1.117 1.379
Crisis -2.250 ** -2.857 **
(banking or currency crisis dummy) 0.878 1.374
Intercept 18.325 ** 13.346 ** 15.689 ** 14.556 **
7.043 5.072 5.848 6.971
No. Countries / No. Observations 83/548 83/548 83/548 83/548
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p-values)
 (a) Sargan Test: 0.461 0.241 0.663 0.187
 (b) Serial Correlation :
       First-Order 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
       Second-Order 0.462 0.383 0.572 0.516
WALD TESTS (p-values)
Ho :Exchange Rate Flexibility Total Effect=0    0.000 0.000
Ho :Financial Development  Total Effect =0 0.032 0.012
** means significant at 5% and * means significant at 10%
Source: Authors' estimations
THRESHOLD ANALYSIS
Growth enhancing effect of exchange rate flexibility if:
Private Credit /GDP greater than:   1.01 1.10
s.e 0.34 0.39
1960-2000
Non-overlapping 5-year averages
35Table 3
Growth Effects of Effective Exchange Rate Real Overvaluation
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Output per Worker
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) Small Sample Robust Correction and Time Effects
(Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
Period:
Unit of observation:
[3.1] [3.2] [3.3] [3.4] 
Degree of the Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation  -0.995 ** -1.162 * -1.176 ** -1.179 **
(log deviation from equilibrium exchange rate) 0.504 0.711 0.534 0.659
Financial Development 0.636 * -0.101 0.595 * -0.040
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) 0.345 2.509 0.330 2.163
Initial Output per Worker -0.038 -0.360 -0.057 -0.355
(log( initial output per worker)) 0.382 0.531 0.369 0.518
Real overvaluation * Financial Development 0.205 ** 0.163 **  
0.077 0.082
Control Variables:
Education 1.185 * 1.532 ** 1.245 ** 1.645 **
(secondary enrollment, in logs) 0.613 0.772 0.595 0.800
Trade Openness 1.328 ** 1.619 ** 1.462 * 1.630 **
(structure-adjusted trade volume/GDP, in logs) 0.626 0.688 0.812 0.777
Government Burden -1.457 * -2.184 -1.329 -1.931
(government consumption/GDP, in logs) 0.827 1.358 0.875 1.483
Lack of Price Stability -4.505 ** -3.819 ** -3.857 ** -3.708 **
(inflation rate, in log [100+inf. rate]) 1.009 1.160 0.935 0.881
Crisis -1.281 -2.082
(banking or currency crisis dummy) 1.326 1.284
Intercept 27.612 ** 27.551 ** 25.148 ** 26.882 **
5.720 8.751 5.556 7.626
No. Countries / No. Observations 83/548 83/548 83/548 83/548
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p-values)
 (a) Sargan Test: 0.413 0.224 0.279 0.220
 (b) Serial Correlation :
       First-Order 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
       Second-Order 0.268 0.278 0.359 0.271
WALD TESTS (p-values)
Ho :Exchange Rate Flexibility Total Effect=0  0.000 0.000
Ho :Financial Development  Total Effect =0 0.037 0.028
** means significant at 5% and * means significant at 10%
Source: Authors' estimations
THRESHOLD ANALYSIS
Growth enhancing effect overvaluation:  
Private Credit /GDP greater than: 1.63 1.28
s.e. 0.65 0.48
Non-overlapping 5-year averages
1960-2000
36iable:  Growth Rate of Output per Worker
Table 4
Growth Effects of the Flexibility of Exchange Rate Regime,Terms-of-Trade Growth and Volatility
Dependent Var
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) Small Sample Robust Correction and Time Effects
(Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
Period: 1960-2000
Unit of observation: Non-overlapping 5-year averages
[4.1] [4.2]   [4.3] [4.4] [4.5]   [4.6]
Terms-of-Trade Growth 0.092 * 0.327 * 0.385 **
  0.054 0.169 0.173
Terms-of-Trade Volatility -0.205 * -0.987 ** -1.189 **
  0.113 0.421 0.410
Degree of the Exchange Flexibility -0.068 -0.826 -0.853 ** -2.748 **
(Reinhart and Rogoff classification) 1.226 0.658 0.392 1.179
Financial Development 1.039 ** 0.783 * 0.285   0.681 * 0.722 * -1.178  
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) 0.463 0.395 0.192 0.378 0.411 0.755
Initial Output per Worker -0.526   -0.644 * -0.702 -0.396 -0.173 -0.061
(log( initial output per worker)) 0.460 0.381 0.465 0.404 0.455 0.514
Flexibility *Terms-of-Trade Growth -0.107 ** -0.136 **      
  0.044 0.062   
Flexibility *Terms-of-Trade Volatility 0.394 ** 0.476 **
  0.197 0.191
Flexibility*Financial Development 0.357 ** 0.525 *
0.159 0.283
Control Variables:
Education 1.740 ** 2.301 ** 2.301 ** 1.541 ** 1.457 ** 1.166 *
(secondary enrollment, in logs) 0.517 0.467 0.571 0.529 0.642 0.687
Trade Openness 0.652 1.493  1.385 * 1.339 1.734 ** 1.832 **
(structure-adjusted trade volume/GDP, in logs) 0.746 1.074 0.706 0.962 0.878 0.931
Government Burden -0.770 -0.762 -0.707 -0.136 -0.977 -0.810  
(government consumption/GDP, in logs) 1.248 1.191 0.982 [1.049] 0.930 0.930
Lack of Price Stability -2.620 ** -4.354 ** -3.560 ** -2.805 * -1.997 * -1.900 *
(inflation rate, in log [100+inf. rate]) 1.260 1.784 1.432 1.567 0.989 1.020
Intercept 13.700 ** 20.450 ** 20.000 ** 13.886 13.388 17.756  
6.310 12.850 9.815 7.358 14.469 15.327
No. Countries / No. Observations 83/548 79/494 79/494 83/548 79/494 79/494
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p-values)
 (a) Sargan Test: 0.335 0.420 0.680 0.670 0.840 0.830
 (b) Serial Correlation :
       First-Order 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
       Second-Order 0.499 0.450 0.450 0.610 0.510 0.480
** means significant at 5% and * means significant at 10%
Source: Authors' estimations   
  
37Table A 1
Growth Effects of the Flexibility of Exchange Rate Regime
Robustness: Different Time Windows
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Output per Worker
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) Small Sample Robust Correction and Time Effects
(Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
Period: 1970-2000 1975-2000 1960-1980 1970-1990  1980-2000  
Unit of observation: Non-overlapping 5-year averages
[1] [2]  [3] [4] [5]
Degree of the Exchange Flexibility -1.742 ** -3.090 ** -1.189   -2.381 * -3.366 **
(Reinhart and Rogoff clasisification) 0.745 1.453 2.010 1.126 1.540
Financial Development -0.800 -2.055 0.080 -2.040 -2.110
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) 0.666 1.455 0.126 1.280 1.550
Initial Output per Worker 0.132 0.102 0.002 0.240 0.698
(log( initial output per worker)) 0.378 0.540 0.371 0.480 0.540
Flexibility * Financial Development 0.428 ** 0.751 ** 0.330 0.493 * 0.749 **
0.229 0.321 0.340 0.274 0.353
No. Countries / No. Observations 79/421 79/352 78/273 78/275 79/282
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p-values)
 (a) Sargan Test: 0.596 0.269 0.279 0.162 0.155
 (b) Second Order Serial Correlation : 0.125 0.619 0.153 0.269 0.47
** means significant at 5% and * means significant at 10%
Table A 2
Growth Effects of the Real Effective Exchange Rate Volatility
Robustness: Different Time Windows
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Output per Worker
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) Small Sample Robust Correction and Time Effects
(Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
Period: 1970-2000 1975-2000 1960-1980 1970-1990  1980-2000  
Unit of observation: Non-overlapping 5-year averages
[1] [2]  [3] [4] [5]
Real Exchange Rate Volatility -4.002 ** -4.493 ** -3.561   -5.231 ** -3.934 **
  0.464 1.587 2.720 1.630 1.326
Financial Development -1.747 -2.566 * -1.064 -3.325 ** -2.501 **
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) 1.159 1.373 2.396 1.265 1.149
Initial Output per Worker -0.374 1.009 * -0.949 0.486 0.928
(log( initial output per worker)) 0.474 0.606 0.855 0.522 0.664
Exchange Rate Volatility  * Financial Development 1.030 ** 1.077 ** 0.716 1.249 ** 0.939 **
0.464 0.464 0.464 0.412 0.401
No. Countries / No. Observations 83/475 83/398 83/307 83/318 83/319
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p-values)
 (a) Sargan Test: 0.14 0.11 0.22 0.41 0.10
 (b) Second Order Serial Correlation : 0.17 0.66 0.96 0.72 0.61
 
** means significant at 5% and * means significant at 10%
Note: The specification of the regression is identical to regression 2, Table 1 and 2. The coefficients for the other control variables - secondary 
Schooling, Inflation, Openness to Trade and Government Size - are not reported
38Table A 3
Growth Effects of the Flexibility of Exchange Rate Regime
Robustness: Different Exchange Rate Regime Classifications
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Output per Worker
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) Small Sample Robust Correction and Time Effects
(Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
Period: 1970-2000 1970-2000 1970-2000  1970-2000  
Unit of observation:
Exchange Rate Classification
 De Facto      
(RR Coarse)
De Facto        
( Gosh and al.)
De Facto    
(Initial LYS)
De Facto    
(Modified LYS)
Degree of the Exchange Flexibility -0.863 ** -2.280 ** 1.628   -2.795 **
  0.390 0.954 1.660 1.207
Financial Development -1.270 -0.740 -0.462 -1.017
  0.963 0.990 0.500 1.100
Initial Output per Worker -0.085 -0.180 -0.391 -1.076 *
(log( initial output per worker)) 0.430 0.489 0.630 0.639
Flexibility * Financial Development 0.215 ** 0.830 ** -0.462   0.688 **
0.080 0.435 0.501 0.335
No. Countries / No. Observations 79/421 79/401 79/418 79/388
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p-values)
 (a) Sargan Test: 0.24 0.585 0.31 0.35
 (b) Second Order Serial Correlation : 0.565 0.114 0.59 0.41
 
** means significant at 5% and * means significant at 10%
Exchange Rate Flexibility Annual Coding:
De Facto (RR Coarse) : 13 ways Reinhart and Rogoff  Coarse Classification (1: Fix to 13: Float)
De Facto (Gosh and al.): 3 ways Consensus Classification 1=Fix and Peg Regime , 2 = Intermediated Regime, 3 = Floating Regime
De Facto (Levy-Yeyati and al.): 4 ways Classification coded as  (1: Fix; 2: Peg ; 3 Managed Float; 4 Float)
Non-overlapping 5-year averages
Note: The specification of the regression is identical to regression 2, Table 1 and 2. The coefficients for the other 
control variables - secondary Schooling, Inflation, Openness to Trade and Government Size - are not reported
39Table A4
Growth Effects of  Real  Effective Exchange Rate Volatility
Robustness: Alternative Measure of  Effective Exchange Rate Volatility
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Output per Worker
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) Small Sample Robust Correction and Time Effects
(Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
 
Period:
Unit of observation:
[A4.1] [A4.2] [A4.3] [A4.4] [A4.5] [A4.6] [A4.7] [A4.8]
Real Exchange Rate Volatility -0.968 **   -3.28 **   -0.831 ** -3.985 **
0.294  0.92   0.269 1.112
Nominal  Exchange Rate Volatility 0.037 -0.134 -0.277 -2.491 *
0.264 0.858 0.279 1.163
Financial Development 0.209 0.678 -1.576 * 0.186 0.227 0.168 -2.64 ** -2.017 **
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) 0.529 0.543 0.811 0.658 0.45 0.692 1.024 0.763
Initial Output per Worker -0.605 -0.719 ** -0.52 -0.702 0.574 * 0.975 * 1.081 ** 1.363 **
(log( initial output per worker)) 0.502 0.539 0.489 0.564 0.33 0.596 0.411 0.382
Real Exchange Rate Volatility * Financial Development 0.672 ** 0.739 **
  0.24 0.273
Nominal Exchange Rate Volatility * Financial Development 0.065 0.699 **
0.265 0.32
     
No. Countries / No. Observations 74/421 82/603 74/421 82/603   73/335 82/603 73/335 82/392
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p-values)
 (a) Sargan Test: 0.75 0.14 0.65 0.1 0.74 0.61 0.32 0.52
 (b) Second Order Serial Correlation : 0.22 0.17 0.25 0.31 0.32 0.98 0.26 0.67
 
    
Note: The specification of the regression is identical to regression 1 and regression 2, Table 2. The 
coefficients for the other control variables - secondary Schooling, Inflation, Openness to Trade and 
Government Size - are not reported
1960-2000
Non-overlapping 5-year averages
1975-2000
Non-overlapping 5-year averages
40Table A 5
Growth Effects of the Flexibility of Exchange Rate Regime
Robustness: Different Measures of Financial Development
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Output per Worker
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) Small Sample Robust Correction and Time Effects
(Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
Period: 1970-2000 1970-2000
Unit of observation:
    
Degree of the Exchange Flexibility -1.530 ** -1.602 **
(Reinhart and Rogoff clasisification) 0.510 0.489
Financial Development -1.630     
(liquid liabilities/GDP) 1.210
Financial Development -3.510 *
(deposit money banks assets/GDP) 1.970
Initial Output per Worker 0.410 0.860
(log( initial output per worker)) 0.489 0.604
Flexibility * Financial Development 0.670 ** 1.172 *  
0.290 0.707
No. Countries / No. Observations 77/400 77/404
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p-values)
 (a) Sargan Test: 0.342 0.523
 (b) Second Order Serial Correlation : 0.121 0.122
 
** means significant at 5% and * means significant at 10%
Source: Authors' estimations
Non-overlapping 5-year averages
Note: The specification of the regression is identical to regression 3, Table 1. The coefficients for the 
other control variables - secondary Schooling, Inflation, Openness to Trade and Government Size - 
are not reported
41Table A 6
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Output per Worker
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) Small Sample Robust Correction and Time Effects
(Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
Period:
Unit of observation:
[5.1] [5.2]   [5.3]
Degree of the Exchange Flexibility -4.845 **
(Reinhart and Rogoff clasisification) 2.287
Real Exchange Rate Volatility -3.361 *
1.797
Degree of the Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation  -3.886 **
(log deviation from equilibrium exchange rate) 1.308
Financial Development 0.640 ** 1.180 ** 0.593 *
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) 0.315 0.504 0.305
Initial Output per Worker -1.474 ** -1.830 ** -3.074
(log( initial output per worker)) 0.641 0.595 2.126
Flexibility*Initial Ouput Per Worker 0.568 **
  0.265
Exchange Rate Volatility*Initial Ouput Per Worker 0.358 **
0.173
Real overvaluation*Initial Ouput Per Worker 0.401 **
0.180
Control Variables:
Education 1.505 ** 2.470 ** 1.518 **
(secondary enrollment, in logs) 0.703 0.567 0.678
Trade Openness 1.003 1.137 1.212 *
(structure-adjusted trade volume/GDP, in logs) 0.718 1.102 0.706
Government Burden -0.952 -0.795 -1.327
(government consumption/GDP, in logs) 1.419 1.261 0.988
Lack of Price Stability -4.006 ** -2.034 -3.801 **
(inflation rate, in log [100+inf. rate]) 0.981 1.347 0.945
Crisis -1.889 * -2.623 ** -1.908 *
(banking or currency crisis dummy) 1.064 1.184 1.050
Intercept 30.217 ** 20.266 ** 46.119 **
6.837 7.668 16.205
No. Countries / No. Observations 79/497 83/548 83/548
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p-values)
 (a) Sargan Test: 0.595 0.180 0.423
 (b) Serial Correlation :
       First-Order 0.000 0.000 0.000
       Second-Order 0.364 0.417 0.312
WALD TESTS (p-values)
Ho :Exchange Rate Measure Total Effect=0  0.000 0.017 0.000
Ho :Initial Output Total Effect =0 0.014 0.000 0.000
** means significant at 5% and * means significant at 10%
Source: Authors' estimations
THRESHOLD ANALYSIS
Growth enhancing effect of each exchange rate measure:  
Ouput Per Worker  greater than (1995 US$) 5099 12063.39 16047
s.e. 2321 5329 6477
   
 
Growth Effects of  the Flexibility of Exchange Rate Regime, Real Exchange Rate Volatility and  Real 
Overvaluation: The Role of Distance to the Technological Frontier
1960-2000
Non-overlapping 5-year averages
42Table A 7
Growth Effects of the Flexibility of Exchange Rate Regime
Robustness: Omission of a Continent
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Output per Worker
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) Small Sample Robust Correction and Time Effects
(Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
Continent Omitted
East Asia 
and Pacific
Europe and 
Central Asia
Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean
Middle East 
and North 
Africa
North 
America South Asia
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
Period:
Unit of observation:
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Degree of the Exchange Flexibility -1.608*   -1.944* -2.003** -1.931* -2.200*   -2.373* -1.442*
(Reinhart and Rogoff clasisification) 0.702     1.136   0.621     0.959   0.859     0.998   0.801  
Financial Development -0.921     -1.091   -0.907     -0.488   -0.736     -1.437* -0.73  
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) 0.580     0.836   0.707     0.635   0.643     0.668   0.500  
Initial Output per Worker -0.273     0.703   0.013     0.376   -0.509     0.668* 0.351  
(log( initial output per worker)) 0.388     0.541   0.455     0.405   0.387     0.378   0.532  
Flexibility * Financial Development 0.43** 0.338* 0.253** 0.36* 0.461** 0.442* 0.293*
0.202     0.191   0.126     0.227   0.229     0.247   0.17  
No. Observations 364     321   315     376   409     403   338  
No. Countries 69     62   59     71   77     76   60  
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p-values)
 (a) Sargan Test: 0.61     0.65   0.7     0.53   0.46     0.46   0.66  
 (b) Second Order Serial Correlation : 0.11     0.08   0.24     0.64   0.18     0.11   0.24  
 
** means significant at 5% and * means significant at 10%
Table A 8  
Growth Effects of the Real Effective Exchange Rate Volatility
Robustness: Omission of a Continent
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Output per Worker
Estimation: 2-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2004) Small Sample Robust Correction and Time Effects
(Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
Continent Omitted
East Asia 
and Pacific
Europe and 
Central Asia
Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean
Middle East 
and North 
Africa
North 
America South Asia
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
Period: 1970-2000
Unit of observation:
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Real Exchange Rate Volatility -3.324*   -4.139*   -3.606* -4.484*   -2.448* -5.247** -1.828  
  1.573     1.884     1.731   1.876     1.374   1.691     1.627  
Financial Development -2.076*   -1.475     -0.819   -1.672     -0.06   -2.543** -0.315  
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) 1.259     1.344     1.296   1.405     0.897   1.247     1.127  
Initial Output per Worker 0.092     0.599     -0.112   0.452     -0.393   -0.215     -0.417  
(log( initial output per worker)) 0.515     0.659     0.553   0.511     0.531   0.493     0.615  
Exchange Rate Volatility  * Financial Development 0.852** 0.811** 0.763* 1.029** 0.635* 1.353** 0.628
0.427     0.305     0.43   0.522     0.343   0.501     0.446  
No. Observations 412     367     349   428     463   451     380  
No. Countries 72     65     62   74     81   79     65  
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p-values)
 (a) Sargan Test: 0.37     0.47     0.65   0.19     0.24   0.15     0.48  
 (b) Second Order Serial Correlation : 0.15     0.44     0.83   0.53     0.47   0.23     0.02  
Note: The specification of the regression is identical to regression 3, Table 1 and 2. The coefficients for the other control variables - secondary 
Schooling, Inflation, Openness to Trade and Government Size - are not reported
1970-2000
Non-overlapping 5-year averages
Non-overlapping 5-year averages
43A Construction of the Real Exchange Rate Measures
A.1 Eﬀective Real Exchange Rate
We construct a trade-weighted eﬀective exchange rate measure using the same time invariant
trade weights as in Goldfajn and Valdes (1999): trade shares with major trade partners in 1985
from United Nation Trade Statistics. The list of major trade partners is given in Appendix
B. As reliable data on labor costs are available only for a small subset of countries, we use
the relative price level of consumption from international comparison of prices in Penn World
Tables 6.1 in order to obtain real exchange rate values. The formula for the eﬀective real
exchange rate is:
RERSH
i =
J Y
j=1
(Pi/Pj)wi,j
where i ∈ [1,83] and j ∈ [1,14] index the country and its trade partners, Pi and Pj are the
prices of the same basket of consumption goods in US dollars in country i and country j and
wij the weight of country j in the trade exchange of country i.
An alternative measure of the eﬀective real exchange rate is constructed using monthly
CPI data from International Finance Statistics and monthly nominal exchange rate. As CPI
is an index series normalized at 100 in 2000 for every countries, we obtained an index of real
exchange rate:
RER
cpi
i =
J Y
j=1
(I
cpi
i /SijI
cpi
j )wi,j
where I
cpi
i i st h eC P Ii n d e xi nc o u n t r yi and Sij is the nominal exchange rate between country
i and country j. A corresponding index of nominal eﬀective exchange rate is computed as
EER
cpi
i =
J Y
j=1
(1/Sij)wi,j
A . 2 R e a lE x c h a n g eR a t eV o l a t i l i t y
The volatility of the real exchange rate used in the regression analysis is computed in each ﬁve
year interval as the annual standard deviation of the growth rate of the eﬀective real exchange
rate:44
σi,t,t+5 = stdev[ln(RERSH
it ) − ln(RERSH
it−1)]
An alternative measure of real exchange rate volatility and a measure of nominal exchange
rate volatility are derived with the same formula using respectively the second measure of real
44Using growth rates to control for trending behavior in real exchange rate is standard in the literature (e.g.
Hussain, Mody and Rogoﬀ (2005))
44eﬀective exchange rate (RER
cpi
i ) and the corresponding measure of nominal eﬀective exchange
rate (EER
cpi
i ).
A.3 Real Overvaluation
In order to construct a measure of real exchange rate overvaluation, we follow Dollar (1992).
The equilibrium concept for the real exchange rate is Purchasing Power Parity adjusted from
diﬀerences in the relative price of non tradeables to tradeables attributed to diﬀerences in
factor endowments (i.e. the ”Balassa-Samuelson” eﬀect). Following Dollar (1992), we perform
the following pooled OLS regression where income per capita and geographical dummies are
used as proxies for factor endowments:
ln(RERSH
i,t )=α + βtdt + γ ln(Yit)+δlac+ ηafri+ εi,t (17)
where dt is a time dummy, Yit GDP per capita, lac and afri continental dummies for Latin-
American and African countries. Therefore, the real overvaluation measure is deﬁned as:
ROV Ii,t = 100 × [((RERSH
i,t ) − \ RERSH
i,t )]
where \ RERSH
i,t is obtained by taking the antilog of the predicted series in regression (17).45
An alternative measure of Real Overvaluation is derived following Goldfajn-Valdes (1999)
as the log deviation of the CPI based measure of real exchange rate, RERCPI
i from a stochastic
trend constructed using a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter λ =1 0 8.
45The estimation of equation (17) yields
coef
e γ 0.234***
e δ -0.139***
e η -0.081***
R
2 0.27
*** denotes 1% signiﬁcance
45Appendix B: List of 83 Countries
Algeria Greece Panama
Argentina* Guatemala Papua New Guinea
Australia* Haiti Paraguay
Austria Honduras Peru
Bangladesh Iceland Philippines
Belgium India Portugal
Bolivia Indonesia Senegal
Botswana Iran, Islamic Rep. Sierra Leone
Brazil* Ireland Singapore*
Burkina Faso Israel South Africa*
Canada Italy* Spain*
Chile Jamaica Sri Lanka
China Japan* Sweden
Colombia Jordan Switzerland
Congo, Dem. Rep. Kenya Syrian Arab Republic
Congo, Rep. Korea, Rep. Thailand
Costa Rica Madagascar Togo
Cote d'Ivoire Malawi Trinidad and Tobago
Denmark Malaysia Tunisia
Dominican Republic Mexico Turkey
Ecuador Morocco Uganda
Egypt, Arab Rep. Netherlands* United Kingdom*
El Salvador New Zealand United States*
Finland Nicaragua Uruguay
France* Niger Venezuela, RB
Gambia, The Nigeria Zambia
Germany* Norway Zimbabwe
Ghana Pakistan
* Major trading partner
46Appendix C: Definitions and Sources of Variables Used in Regression Analysis
Variable Definition and Construction Source
GDP per capita Ratio of total GDP to total population. GDP is in 1985 PPP-
adjusted US$. 
Authors' construction using Summers and 
Heston (1991) and The World Bank 
(2002).
GDP per capita growth  Log difference of real GDP per capita. Authors' construction using Summers and 
Heston (1991) and The World Bank 
(2002).
Initial GDP per capita Initial value of ratio of total GDP to total population. GDP is 
in 1985 PPP-adjusted US$. 
Authors' construction using Summers and 
Heston (1991) and The World Bank 
(2002).
Output per worker Real GDP  per worker. Summers and Heston (1991).
Output per worker growth Log difference of real output per worker. Authors' construction using Summers and 
Heston (1991).
Initial Output per worker Initial value of Real GDP Chain per worker. Authors' construction using Summers and 
Heston (1991).
Degree of exchange rate 
flexibility
See Section 3.1 Reinhart and Rogoff (2001).
Education Ratio of total secondary enrollment, regardless of age, to the 
population of the age group that officially corresponds to that 
level of education. 
World Development Network (2002) and 
The World Bank (2002).
Private Credit Ratio of domestic credit claims on private sector to GDP  Author’s calculations using data from IFS,
the publications of the Central Bank and
PWD. The method of calculations is based
on Beck, Demiguc-Kunt and Levine
(1999).
Terms-of-Trade Growth Growth Rate of Terms of Trade Index. Terms of Trade Index 
shows the national account exports price index divided by 
imports price index with a 1995 base year.
World Development Network (2002) and
The World Bank (2002).
Trade Openness Residual of a regression of the log of the ratio of exports and 
imports (in 1995 US$) to GDP (in 1995 US$), on the logs of 
area and population, and dummies for oil exporting and for 
landlocked countries.
Author’s calculations with data from 
World Development Network (2002) and 
The World Bank (2002).
Government Size Ratio of government consumption to GDP. The World Bank (2002).
CPI Consumer price index (2000 = 100) at the end of the year. Author’s calculations using data from IFS.
Inflation rate Annual % change in CPI. Author’s calculations using data from IFS.
Lack of Price Stability log(100+inflation rate).  Author’s calculations using data from IFS.
Real Effective Exchange 
Rate 
See Appendix A Author’s calculations using data from IFS 
and UN Trade Statistics
Real Effective Exchange 
Rate Volatility
See Appendix A Author’s calculations with data from IFS 
and UN Trade Statistics
Real Exchange Rate 
Overvaluation
See Appendix A Author’s calculations with data from IFS 
and UN Trade Statistics
Crisis dummy Number of years in which a country underwent a systemic
banking or a currency crisis, as a fraction of the number of
years in the corresponding period.
Author’s calculations using data from
Caprio and Klingebiel (1999), Kaminsky
and Reinhart (1998), and Gosh, Gulde and
Wolf (2000).
REGULATION INDEXES Each index measures the intensity of the regulatory system on
a scale from 0 to 1 (1 representing the heaviest regulation). In
order to be able to combine all components, Loayza, Oviedo
and Serven (2004) apply the following standarization formula
to each one of them:
Loayza, Oviedo and Serven (2004).
 higher values of X indicate heavier regulation
Overall Regulation Average score of entry, financial market, labor, trade, fiscal
burden, contract enforcement and bankrupcy regulation
measures.
Loayza, Oviedo and Serven (2004).
Product Market Regulation Average score of entry, financial market, trade, contract
enforcement and bankrupcy regulation measures.
Loayza, Oviedo and Serven (2004).
Labor Regulation Combines the percentage of workers that belong to a union,
the minimun mandatory conditions and the degree of hiring
and firing flexibility granted.
Loayza, Oviedo and Serven (2004).
Regulation of Entry Combines the number of legal steps required to register a new 
business with an indicator of the overall legal burden of 
registration and willingness of the government to facilitate the
process and intervene minimally.
Loayza, Oviedo and Serven (2004).
Bankrupcy Regulation Regulation measures the efficiency of bankrupcy process by
combining the time and cost of insolvency, the enforcement
of priority of claims, the extent to which the efficient
outcome is achieved , and the degree of court involvement in
the process.
Loayza, Oviedo and Serven (2004).
Period-specific Shifts Time dummy variables. Authors’ construction.
min max
min
X X
X X
X
i
−
−
=
47APPENDIX D : DESCRIPTIVE  STATISTICS
SAMPLE ANNUAL SUMMARY STATSITICS  (1960-2000)
Variable Observations Mean Std. Deviation Min  Max  
Flexibility of Exchange Rate 3224 1.84 0.91 1.00 4.00
Private Credit/ GDP 3587 34.88 36.07 0.01 236.98
Ouput per Worker 3801 13277.66 18389.82 123.39 86957.22
Secondary Schooling 3974 46.83 31.91 0.82 140.10
Adjusted Openness to Trade 3377 0.00 0.57 -2.82 1.83
Rate of Inflation 3651 15.03 34.93 -49.81 553.91
Government Expenditures to GDP 3945 14.58 6.38 0.91 76.22
Dummy Banking or Currency Crisis 3403 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
SAMPLE ANNUAL CORRELATION (1960-2000)
Flexibility of 
Exchange Rate
Private Credit/ 
GDP
Ouput per 
Worker
Secondary 
Schooling
Adjusted 
Openness to 
Trade
Rate of 
Inflation
Government 
Expenditures 
to GDP
Dummy 
Crisis
Flexibility of Exchange Rate 1.00
Private Credit/ GDP 0.18 1.00
Ouput per Worker 0.10 0.74 1.00
Secondary Schooling 0.11 0.32 0.42 1.00
Adjusted Openness to Trade -0.02 0.09 -0.07 0.19 1.00
Rate of Inflation 0.17 -0.20 -0.18 -0.07 -0.12 1.00
Government Expenditures to GDP 0.06 0.28 0.44 0.35 0.24 -0.08 1.00
Dummy Banking or Currency Crisis 0.09 0.06 -0.07 0.07 0.06 0.08 -0.05 1.00
SAMPLE CORRELATION OF  EXCHANGE RATE MEASURES (1960-2000; DATA IN  FIVE-YEAR AVERAGE)
 
Exchange Rate 
Flexibility
Real Effective 
Exchange Rate 
Volatility*
Real Effective 
Exchange Rate 
Volatility**
Nominal  Effective 
Exchange Rate 
Volatility**
Real 
Overvaluation
Exchange Rate Flexibility 1.00  
Real Effective Exchange Rate Volatility* 0.22 1.00
Real Effective Exchange Rate Volatility** 0.23 0.70 1.00
Nominal  Effective Exchange Rate Volatility** 0.36 0.53 0.38 1.00
Real Overvaluation 0.09 0.13 0.11 -0.05 1.00
* based on Penn World Table (see Appendix A)
**based on International Financial Statistics (see Appendix A)
Average Monthly Volatility of  Real Effective 
Exchange Rate by Exchange Rate Regime*
Regime Full sample Excluding outliers**
Fix 1.61 1.53
Peg 1.60 1.60
Managed Float 2.84 2.56
Float 2.59 2.59
Free Falling 7.35 5.38
*average by exchange rate regime of monthly volatility
monthly volatility = standard deviation of change in RER computed over a year
**excluding the 1% upper tail of each distribution of monthly volatility
Average Annual Volatility (%) of  Real Effective Exchange Rate 
and Selected Aggregate Variables* 
Variable Full sample Without free falling years
Volatility of  Real  Effective Exchange Rate 18.01 15.45
Volatility of Real Per Capita Output Growth 4.55 3.78
Volatility of CPI inflation 16.35 7.24
Volatility of Term of Trade Growth 10.65 9.71
Volatility of Fiscal Expenditures over GDP 9.93 8.06
Volatility of Trade Weighted Comodity Price Ch 7.59 7.53
* cross-sectional average of the standard deviation computed for each variable in each country over 1960-2000
48